Temporal ontology of law

The monograph sets out the author’s concept of law enforcement - temporal ontology of law. On the basis of the ontological difference between being and being, as well as the postontological difference between being and being as such (M. Heidegger), the author concludes that the right is primaryly localized in relations between people as an attraction between an act, relevant in a legal sense and its legal consequences. This attraction, which the author calls legal being, comes true in the horizon of a specific legal time - a gap between the perfect act and the consequences attracted by it. This syncretic unity of legal being and legal time is called a legal incident. At the same time, since the legal consequences may not occur in a legal incident, and the right itself is “inquiringly withstanded in the possibility of non -being”, the legal incident is equally containing both the possibilities of the incident of law and that the right will not happen - it will not come true - And then we will not have any right at all. Thus, the author constructs the original - temporal - ontology of law, when law does not initially exist in cash, as a kind of continural normative field, but is reproduced in the form of many discrete, singular and unique incidents