Invisible power. How American diplomacy works
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William Burns, called The Atlantic by the US Secret Diplomatic Weapon, was in the US State Department for five presidents and ten Secretary of State. During his long career, Burns was related to many significant events of recent years: the operation “Storm in the desert” in 1991, the invasion of Yugoslavia in 1999, discussing the expansion of NATO, a nuclear deal with Iran.
In the book, the author reveals previously unknown historical details and gives recently declassified telegrams and memorandums, which give a rare opportunity to understand how diplomatic work is actually conducted - it does not always go through official channels, through ambassadors and meetings on the highest level.
Since since the late 1980s. William Burns actively worked in the Russian direction, and in 2005-2008. He was the US ambassador to the Russian Federation, his opinion on Russian politics and the situation in the country can give a lot of valuable information about why Russian-American relations were built in one way or another and why in the end they came to a dead end.
The question of the expansion of NATO and the adoption of the former allies of Russia under the Warsaw Treaty to the members of this organization was not so simple. Yeltsin and the Russian elite believed, and in many ways it is true that the guarantees given by Jim Baker during negotiations on the unification of Germany in 1990, when he said that NATO would not be expanded “not for an inch east” and after and after the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, the promise of the Baker was neither exactly formulated, nor officially recorded on paper, so Clinton’s administration believed, and also not without reason that the promise of the Secretary of State belonged to the USSR, and not to Russia. At the beginning of his presidential term, Clinton was in no hurry to raise the question of the expansion of NATO, but his first national security adviser Tony Lake was always a supporter of this step. Lake argued that the United States and their European allies presented a rare historical opportunity to help such former communist countries as Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, firmly to take the path of building democracy and a market economy.
In response to the question of Obama, asked at the beginning of the meeting, there was no less than a 50-minute monologue of Putin, full of insults, consumptions and malicious comments. I thought about whether the correct advice gave our president, and doubted whether I had a future in his administration. The meeting was supposed to last only an hour, and Putin had already spoke the most part. He took us in a luxurious atmosphere, under a canopy in an exquisite courtyard. The waiters, dressed in costumes of the XVIII century. They served countless dishes. I only drank coffee and listened to a familiar mournful list of complaints: George Bush - Jr., who Putin liked so much, seeing the intentions of the Russian president to build strong relations after the events of September 11, 2001, did not meet him, and the US administration was shutting down in Iraq and organized colorful. Revolution in Ukraine and Georgia. The Iranian threat bothered him less than Medvedev, but about the about and about the imaginary unwillingness of the administration of George Bush - Jr. to listen to his opinion, he spoke out with a burning resentment. Putin was not very courteous, sometimes expressed rudely and generally demonstrated personal neglect of work with the Americans.
After the war in the Persian Gulf, many of us naively believed that Saddam Hussein’s regime would collapse under the oppression of internal contradictions. No matter how skeptical we relate to the statements of most representatives of the intelligence community that sounded during preparation for the 2003 war that Saddam has weapons of mass destruction, we have never thought that the Iraqi dictator may only try to create the illusion of that that he has it to scare away external and internal enemies. The lack of imagination prevented the honest discussion of the need for war as such, as well as the correct assessment of the risks of an alternative political decision. It is unnecessary to say that in the broad sense, our stubborn unwillingness to soberly evaluate the inevitable negative consequences of the war led to even more tragic results.
Baker, who spent several hours in the dignity, contradicting President Yemen, warned Ali Abdullah Salekh that his refusal to vote for the adoption of the resolution will cost Yemen very, very expensive. The Secretary of State was not joking. When Salekh refused to support the resolution, the State Department instantly achieved a reduction in Yemen by 90%
In the book, the author reveals previously unknown historical details and gives recently declassified telegrams and memorandums, which give a rare opportunity to understand how diplomatic work is actually conducted - it does not always go through official channels, through ambassadors and meetings on the highest level.
Since since the late 1980s. William Burns actively worked in the Russian direction, and in 2005-2008. He was the US ambassador to the Russian Federation, his opinion on Russian politics and the situation in the country can give a lot of valuable information about why Russian-American relations were built in one way or another and why in the end they came to a dead end.
The question of the expansion of NATO and the adoption of the former allies of Russia under the Warsaw Treaty to the members of this organization was not so simple. Yeltsin and the Russian elite believed, and in many ways it is true that the guarantees given by Jim Baker during negotiations on the unification of Germany in 1990, when he said that NATO would not be expanded “not for an inch east” and after and after the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, the promise of the Baker was neither exactly formulated, nor officially recorded on paper, so Clinton’s administration believed, and also not without reason that the promise of the Secretary of State belonged to the USSR, and not to Russia. At the beginning of his presidential term, Clinton was in no hurry to raise the question of the expansion of NATO, but his first national security adviser Tony Lake was always a supporter of this step. Lake argued that the United States and their European allies presented a rare historical opportunity to help such former communist countries as Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, firmly to take the path of building democracy and a market economy.
In response to the question of Obama, asked at the beginning of the meeting, there was no less than a 50-minute monologue of Putin, full of insults, consumptions and malicious comments. I thought about whether the correct advice gave our president, and doubted whether I had a future in his administration. The meeting was supposed to last only an hour, and Putin had already spoke the most part. He took us in a luxurious atmosphere, under a canopy in an exquisite courtyard. The waiters, dressed in costumes of the XVIII century. They served countless dishes. I only drank coffee and listened to a familiar mournful list of complaints: George Bush - Jr., who Putin liked so much, seeing the intentions of the Russian president to build strong relations after the events of September 11, 2001, did not meet him, and the US administration was shutting down in Iraq and organized colorful. Revolution in Ukraine and Georgia. The Iranian threat bothered him less than Medvedev, but about the about and about the imaginary unwillingness of the administration of George Bush - Jr. to listen to his opinion, he spoke out with a burning resentment. Putin was not very courteous, sometimes expressed rudely and generally demonstrated personal neglect of work with the Americans.
After the war in the Persian Gulf, many of us naively believed that Saddam Hussein’s regime would collapse under the oppression of internal contradictions. No matter how skeptical we relate to the statements of most representatives of the intelligence community that sounded during preparation for the 2003 war that Saddam has weapons of mass destruction, we have never thought that the Iraqi dictator may only try to create the illusion of that that he has it to scare away external and internal enemies. The lack of imagination prevented the honest discussion of the need for war as such, as well as the correct assessment of the risks of an alternative political decision. It is unnecessary to say that in the broad sense, our stubborn unwillingness to soberly evaluate the inevitable negative consequences of the war led to even more tragic results.
Baker, who spent several hours in the dignity, contradicting President Yemen, warned Ali Abdullah Salekh that his refusal to vote for the adoption of the resolution will cost Yemen very, very expensive. The Secretary of State was not joking. When Salekh refused to support the resolution, the State Department instantly achieved a reduction in Yemen by 90%
Author:
Author:Berns U.
Cover:
Cover:Hard
Category:
- Category:Politics & Social Science
- Category:Reference books
- Category:Social Science & Politics
Publication language:
Publication Language:Russian
Series:
Series: “Russia in Global Policy” recommends ”
Age restrictions:
Age restrictions:16+
ISBN:
ISBN:978-5-9614-2828-5
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