Mathematical problems of decision-making in dynamic

The monograph develops a theory of decision -making in dynamic organizational systems with a complex structure in conflict and uncertainty. A review of the current state of theory is given. Systems are studied: hierarchical, coalition and coalition-hierarchical (hybrid) The main attention in the process of constructing mathematical models of systems is paid to describing the methods of information interaction between persons making decisions. At the same time, the options for their undesirable (conflict) and benevolent "mood" are taken into account. Two approaches to making decisions based on the principle of guaranteed result and approaches of the game theory are proposed. Namely: 1) making decisions from the point of view of the selected participant of the system based on penal functions and obtaining the necessary optimality conditions, 2) decision -based on the special principles of optimality designed using the principles of Nash, Pareto, Joffrion, Stacelselberg, Slateer, and threats - Controller and obtaining sufficient optimality conditions. Some theoretical results are illustrated by model examples.
For scientists, graduate students and students involved in theoretical and practical issues of decision -making in complex systems