Auctions modeling
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This book is a detailed lecture notes on auctions modeling course. The most important difference between a book and other books on modeling auctions is a huge number of problems with solutions!
There are four chapters in the book. The first is about different types of auctions and the theorem about the equivalence of profitability, which claims that with the independence of players, all auctions bring the same income to the auction to the organizer of the auction. The second chapter is technical. Its goal is to fill in gaps on the theory of probability, tell the technique of solving problems using O -small, and explain the concept of affiliated signals. The third chapter is devoted to comparing the profitability of the auction organizer in the event that players are dependent due to the fact that they receive general information about the product. The fourth chapter sets out auctions using the general language of the theory of mechanisms. The chapter introduces the Vikri-Clack-Grovs mechanism and prove the optimality of the auction of the second price with a reserve price.
From the book a curious reader will learn, for example:
- that the auction is not necessarily "uncle with a hammer",
- How the largest auctions are arranged,
- Why is not always the winner of the auction pays the amount that he set,
- how are the different rules of the auction affect the profit of the organizer,
- under what conditions the law of demand can be violated
There are four chapters in the book. The first is about different types of auctions and the theorem about the equivalence of profitability, which claims that with the independence of players, all auctions bring the same income to the auction to the organizer of the auction. The second chapter is technical. Its goal is to fill in gaps on the theory of probability, tell the technique of solving problems using O -small, and explain the concept of affiliated signals. The third chapter is devoted to comparing the profitability of the auction organizer in the event that players are dependent due to the fact that they receive general information about the product. The fourth chapter sets out auctions using the general language of the theory of mechanisms. The chapter introduces the Vikri-Clack-Grovs mechanism and prove the optimality of the auction of the second price with a reserve price.
From the book a curious reader will learn, for example:
- that the auction is not necessarily "uncle with a hammer",
- How the largest auctions are arranged,
- Why is not always the winner of the auction pays the amount that he set,
- how are the different rules of the auction affect the profit of the organizer,
- under what conditions the law of demand can be violated
Author:
Author:Demeshev Boris Borisovich
Cover:
Cover:Soft
Category:
- Category:Business & Money
ISBN:
ISBN:978-5-97060-523-3
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